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Introduction. 
A usual paradigm in traditional economics is the assumption of an inde-
pendent rational decision-maker who attempts to maximize his welfare (utility, 
profits etc), given a set of side-conditions on the state and control :>pace. 
On the basis of this starting-point the optimal strategies of the decision-
maker can be identified. Furthermore, the same approach can be used as an 
ex post analysis to assess by means of a revealed preference hypothesis the 
reaction parameters of the decision-maker (see for an application to macro-
economie public policy Nijkamp and Somermeijer [1971] and to consumer be-
haviour Blokland [1976]). 
A considerable part of the optimization framework in economics is based 
on independent behaviour of a decision-maker. Clearly,it should be admitted 
that, in the past, several theories have been developed in which the economie 
actions of market participants are assumed to be co-determined by decisions 
of other actors. A well-known example is Duesenberry's relative income 
hypothesis, which states that the difference in consumption behaviour among 
households can be explained by differences in the level of relative income 
i.e., income in relation to the Standard of living of a socio-economic group 
one is accustomed to (see Duesenberry [1952]). The phenomenon of 'keeping up 
with the Joneses' is also closely related to the relative income hypothesis. 
Another example of interdependent market behaviour is a situation of 
limited competition (such as a duopoly or an oligopoly), in which the out-
come of the market process is determined by mutually interdependent strategies 
of all participants (like Cournot and Von Stackelberg strategies). The final 
outcome is the result of a game situation on which basis the equilibrium 
conditions can be analysed (see also Paelinck and Nijkamp [1976]). 
A new contribution to the discussion on interdependent behaviour was 
recently provided by Leibenstein [1976]. Leibenstein claims that the traditional 
neo-classical micro-economie theory has several fundamental shortcomings, inter 
alia by assuming independent decision units (such as families or firms) as 
the methodological basis for rational, behavioural hypotheses. In his opinion, 
individuals should be regarded as the basic elements of a decision framework. 
Instead of a molecular view of these individual units, however, Leibenstein 
makes a plea for a more psychologically oriented analysis of decision 
processes. He claims that psychological factors like motivation and effort 
are extremely important elements in human decision-making, although their 
influence is hardly quantifiable. Therefore, he calls these elements X-
efficiency factors. The implications of Leibenstein's analysis are rather far-
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reaching. If instead of households and firms individuals are assumed to be 
the really motivated units, then it can be demonstrated that utility maxi-
mization by households may be consistent with rational behaviour, but this 
is not a necessary result. Analogously, profit maximization of a firm is 
not a priori consistent with the motivations of the individuals in a firm. 
Consequently, Leibenstein pays much attention to mutual interactions of 
market participants. He offers a detailed analysis of interdependent actions 
such as bandwagon effects, snob effects and Veblen effects, in which also 
game-theoretic elements may play a role (among others in the prisoner's 
dilemma case). Unfortunately, Leibenstein has not elaborated his analysis 
in an operational sense. 
In our opinion, it is worth while to seek for a more operational analysis 
of interdependent decision-making. In the present paper, the problem of 
interdependent choices will be analysed along two different, but comple-
mentary lines. The first approach focusses on market participants or actors 
with mutually conflicting objectives, so that the (optimal) independent 
decisions of the one actor affect the well-being of the other ones. Some 
equilibrium strategies for conflicting actions based on 'displaced ideals' 
will be discussed here. The method of displaced ideals employs ^he ideal 
solutions of a choice problem
 as reference points in order to find a 
minimum discrepancy with respect to the set of feasible or Pareto solutions 
of the choice problem at hand. This situation will be illustrated by the 
well-known dilemma economie growth - environmental preservation (see section M-). 
The second and complementary approach is oriented to a spatial variant 
of the 'keeping up with the Joneses' phenomenon. In this situation certain 
prespecified achievement levels of goal variables (the 'ideal values')of the 
one actor (region) are co-determined by the optimal (and observed) levels of 
the same variables of the other actors. By repeating this situation during 
several periods, the concept of 'displaced ideals' may again be introduced. 
This'keeping up with the Joneses' effect will be illustrated by means of a 
simple two-region economie policy model which is an extension of the preceding 
economic-environmental model (see section 5). 
The formal mathematical framework to describe interdependent decision-
making is based on multi-objective optimization, because both a situation 
of mutually conflicting objectives(in case of diverging strategies of actors), 
and of mutually complementary objectives (in case of adaptive strategies of 
actors), can be formally described as a decision problem with multiple 
objectives. Therefore, section 2 of this paper will give a brief introduction 
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to multi-objectlve optimization. Special attention will be paid to the 
possibility to solve multi-objective programs by means of interactive 
strategies. A powerful interactive tooi in multi-objective decision-making 
is the method of 'displaced ideals' referred to above. 
In the present paper, non-linear objective functions and non-linear 
discrepancy measures will be introduced. Their specifications are based on 
power functions and give rise to non-linear programming models, Therefore, in 
section 3 a brief introduction will be given to a programming method which is 
extremely appropriate for this type of non-linearities, viz. geometrie programming. 
This method appears to provide also a new framework for solving generalized 
non-linear multi-objective models. 
After the presentation of the necessary tools in section 2 and 3, in 
section 4 and 5 some simplified regional environmental models will be presented 
in which both a situation of conflicting priorities (growth versus pollution) 
and of mutually . adaptive priorities (a situation of successive displaced 
ideals) will be analysed.' 
Multi-objective Optimization. 
The traditional measure for the economie health of a country or region 
is average income. Due to the wide variety of external effects related to 
the post-war growth, during the last decade the insight has grown that 
welfare is essentially a multi-dimensional concept including inter alia 
income, growth, environmental quality, distributional equity, supply of 
public facilities and so forth. In other words, the welfare of a country or 
region should be represented by a vector profile instead of by a scalar 
(see for a further discussion Hafkamp and Nijkamp [1978] and Klaassen[1978]). 
In the context of decision models, a multi-dimensional view of welfare 
leads to a plea for multi-objective optimization models, in which multiple 
(conflicting) objective functions are to be optimized simultaneously. The 
reasons for the existence of multiple objective functions may be: the 
presence of non-commensurable objectives, the presence of different interest 
groupings or the presence of spill-over effects. 
In general formal terms, a multi-objective optimization model may be 
represented as: 
(2.1.) r max ui (x) 
{ x € K 
where w (x) is a vector of objective functions, x a vector of decision 
variables and K a feasible area. 
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There is a large set of methods to analyse and solve these- types of 
decision models (an extensive survey of the literature in this field is 
contained in Van Delft and Nijkamp [1977] and Nijkamp [1977b]). A.central 
role in multi-objective optimization theory is played by the concept of a 
Pareto solution (or non-inferior, efficiënt or non-dominated solution). A 
Pareto solution reflects the common feature of multi-objective optimization' 
models that the value of the one objective function cannot be improved without 
affecting the values of the remaining objective functions. Such a solution 
shows the conflicting nature of these models: any feasible point that is not 
dominated by other points can be regarded as a Pareto solution. 
- In formal terms a Pareto solution can be defined as follows: a Pareto 
* 
solution is a vector x for which no other feasible solution vector x does 
exist such that: 
(2.2.) J< (ü (x) > o) (x ) \ and 
ü) . (x) ^  (i). (x ) , for at least one j 
It has been proved among othèrs by Geoffrion [1968] and Kuhn and Tucker 
[1968], that a feasible solution is a Pareto solution x , if and only if a 
* 
vector of weights X does exist (with t' X = 1 and X > o ) , such that x is the 
optimal solution of the following uni-dimensional program: 
max ir = X '{u (x)} 
(2.3.) 
f ir 
\ x £ K 
By means of a parametrisation of X the whole set of Pareto solutions can, 
in principle, be determined, although in practice the algorithms for determin-
ing this set appear to be rather time-consuming. Since the vector X is a set 
of weights associated with each Pareto solution, it plays an important role 
in determining an ultimate equilibrium or compromi.se solution of a multi-
objective model, particularly becausa any good solution of a multi-objective 
decision model should be a Pareto solution. 
A figurative representation of the set of Pareto solutions (the 
efficiency frontier) is contained in Fig. 1, based on 2 objective functions. 
Fig. 1. A functional space with the efficiency frontier of 2 objectives. 
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A closer examination of Fig. 1 leads to the conclusion that only the 
points on the edge between A and B are relevant Pareto points, because (1) 
all interior points are dominated by the points on the edge, (2) all points 
on the edges CA and DB are dominated by point A and B, respectively, and 
(3) no point on the edge AB dominates any other point on this edge. 
Point P of Fig. 1 can be regarded as the ideal point, which is used as 
a reference point for evaluating the points on the efficiency frontier. One 
may assume that the ultimate equilibrium (compromise) solution is that point 
which has a minimum discrepancy with respect to P. This minimum discrepancy 
can be measured by means of a Minkowski metric ty. This gives rise to the 
following compromise model: 
(2.4.) 
t f J s^i/v 
min ty = i ^  (1-S.) 
< 
, , m m 
o). (x; - o). 
5. = — ~— 
D max m m 
w. - w. 
D 1 
x e K 
where J5. is the standardized value of objective function CÜ .. 
D D 
The solution of this compromise model can be calculated by applying non-
linear programming techniques (see section 4). 
In many decision procedures, however, this first compromise is not regarded 
as the final equilibrium solution, so that a certain interactive learning 
procedure has to be developed in order to reach in a series of steps such a 
final solution. Thus the provisional solution has to be presented to the 
decision-maker as a trial solution which has to be judged by him. The decision-
maker has to indicate which objective functions are to be improved and which 
give already satisfactory results. 
Let us denote now the set of objective functions which are to be increased 
in value by S, so that the decision-maker's preferences can be taken into 
account by specifying the following constraint: 
(2.5.) w. (x) > üi. (x) V j £ S 
In consequence, the following model has to be solved: 
max w (x) 
(2
'
6
'
)
 ( x £ K 
u. (x) > u. (x) v j e s 
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Given this model, a new ideal point P.. can be calculated. Clearly this 
displacement of the ideal point is due to condition (2.5.). After the 
calculation of the displaced ideal point, a new compromise solution can be 
determined by means of (2.4.) etc, until finally a satisficing compromise 
is attained. 
This method of displaced ideals was originally developed by Zeleny [ 1976] 
and can be regarded as one of the most practible interactive multi-objective 
decision techniques. An empirical application of this technique to a regional 
industrialization problem can be found in Van Delft and Nijkamp [1977]. The 
latter method will also be employed in subsequent sections which focus 
on the use of non-linear multi-objective models in interdependent decision-
making. 
3. Generalized Non-linear Multi-objective Models. 
Non-linear programming problems have been discussed extensively in 
mathematics and operations research (see for example Zangwill [1969]). The 
necessary and sufficiënt conditions for a global maximum of any differentiabe 
objective function constrained by (in)equalities were derived by Kuhn and 
Tucker [1968] by means of Lagrangian theory. The general conclusion of Kuhn 
and Tucker is that a concavity of the objective function maximized within a 
set of convex constraints will guarantee a global maximum. In spite of the 
generality of their conclusion, the majority of programming models is still 
based on linear relationships. A specific type of non-linear programming 
models, viz. geometrie programming, has received much attention during the 
last decade (see for an introduction Duffin et al. [1967] and Nijkamp [1972]). 
This method appears to fit quite well into the class of problems discussed 
in the previous section, in which objective functions (essentially, dis-
crepancy measures) of a power-type were introduced. Therefore, a brief survey 
of geometrie programming theory will first be given, based on a new present-
ation by means of a matrix formulation. 
The primal formulation of a geometrie programming model is based on a 
minimization of a posynomial (a sum of positive power functions) subject to 
a constraint set of posynomials. The general specification of such a model 
is: 
r
 i 
m i n c|> = c f 
(3.1.) J ~° ~° 
< subject to (s.t.) 
» 
c. f. < 1 , j = 1,. .. , J , 
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where: 
(3.2.) 
and: 
\ L • J ) t • * j U • y / ^ \J m j •*" U j X ^ . B a g U 
(3.3.) In f . = A. In x 
" 3 1 
0,1,...,J 
in which f. is a vector of order (I x 1) with typical elements f... A. an 
I x K matrix with typical elements a., (i=l,...,I; k=l,...,K) and x a 
(K x 1) vector of decision variables (arguments). The coefficients a., may be 
positive or negative. 
The dual specification of such a primal geometrie model is: 
/ 
(3.4.) 
max co 
subject to 
» 
A v = e 
v > o 
J ' t 
y v. (In c. - In v.) + u (In u) 
• ~1 ~1 ~1 -
3=0 J J J 
where v. is a vector of dual variables v. (j=0s...,J; i=l,...,I); 
each separate term of the posynomial program (3.1.) is related to its 
corresponding specific shadow variable. The remaining vectors are defined as: 
u = (u.., 
(3.5.) 
with i being a vector of unit elements, and: 
{\ v1 i v , 
...,u ) 
! u t 
l V ) 
— —u 
(3.6.) e± = . (1 0. .0) 
where e is of order K + 1. Finally, matrix A' of order (K+l) x I(J+1) 
has the following structure: 
(3.7.) 
- i 
i 
1 1 ' 0. 
i 
i 
The primal-dual relationships of the optimum solution of a geometrie pro-
gramming model are: 
(3.8.) 
and 
(3.9.) 
v. 
ï 
J -
c . f . / <f> 
Ol Ol 
C. . f. . U. / (f) 
,i=l,. 
i=l. • » 1 5 1 — 1 9 • • 
In this case the relationship between the primal and dual objective function 
is: 
(3.10.) e" = $ 
Given the primal-dual relationships (3.8.) and (3.9.) and the duality 
condition (3.10.), there is a unique relationship between a primal and a 
dual geometrie programming model. Proofs of the uniqueness of the solution 
can be found among others in Duffin et al. [1967], Luptacik [1977], 
Nijkamp [1972] and Peterson [1976]. 
The foregoing geometrie programming model was based on the existence of 
a single objective function. Now the question arises whether this assumption 
can be relaxed, so that multiple objective functions can also be taken into 
account. 
A first method to deal with multi-objective geometrie programming models 
is to assume a set of primal objective functions ({> , i.e., 
t 
(3.11.) (J> = (<(>., ,4>vj) , 
which are to be minimized within the constraint set already specified in 
(3.1.). It has often been shown (see among others Geoffrion [1967], Kuhn and 
Tucker [1968], and Vemuri [1974]), that such multi-objective programs can be 
numerically solved if a parametric programming algorithm is available for 
the following (constrained) linear convex combination of the N objective 
functions: 
(3.12.) $ = a $ , 
where a is a weight vector satisfying the additivity condition: 
(3.13.) l' a = 1 
This approach is in fact a straightforward application of non-linear pro-
gramming theory and gives rise to the well-known set of Pareto solutions 
discussed already in section 2. 
An alternative and new approach to multi-objective geometrie programs 
might be to define the parametric program not as a linear combination of the 
original N objective functions (an arithmetic mean), but as a non-linear 
combination via a power function ( a geometrie mean). Then the new para-
metric objective function reads as: 
N a 
(3.14.) min $ = TT <f> n 
n=l 
or 
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(3.15.) min In f = a In $ 
It should be noted that f is not necessarily a posynomial expression, 
but it can easily be transformed into a posynomial expression by means of 
an auxiliary posynomial constraint for <J> . Therefore, the generalized para-
metric representation of a vector-valued (multi-objective) geometrie pro-
gramming model is: 
(3.16. ) m m ? 
subject to 
' c. f. < 1 
In $ = a In <j> 
' ~-l 
c f è - 1 Vn 
-on -on yn 
The advantage of this specification is that the parameters a can be inter-
n 
preted as elasticities of the individual objectives <j) with respect to the 
'master' objective function $. Furthermore, the degrees of freedom in the 
dual program (i.e. the number of independent variables over which the dual 
program is to be maximized) of f is smaller than that of $, so that the first 
one is easier to solve. It is clear that due to the arithmetic-geometric 
inequality conditions (see Hardy et al [1959]) the following inequality is 
valid: 
(3.17) $ > $ , 
with an equality, for any value of a , if and only if <(>=<(> = ...cf> . 
n 1 2
 N 
It has been shown by Pascual and Ben-Israel [1971] that the optimal solutions 
of <J> and $ are normally not the same, so that the optimal solutions of <j> need not 
be properly efficiënt solutions of the multi-objective geometrie programming 
model. However, these solutions can be proved to be efficiënt. It is also 
obvious, that the usual features of geometrie programming models hold also 
for (3.16.). Signomial problems (negative signs for certain terms) can also 
be incorporated in (3.16.), for example, in the case of minimizing and 
maximizing objective functions. In the latter case, the maximizing objective 
functions are provided with a negative exponent (-a ). The advantage of the 
n 
power specification of (3.1H.) is that in this case the global optimality 
of the equilibrium solution is still guaranteed, because a negative exponent 
does still give rise to a posynomial expression. This is also a considerable 
advantage compared to the linear parametric program (3.12.); in that case, 
a negative sign of a would lead to rather complicated signomial problems, 
for which a global optimality of a solution cannot be assumed. 
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Computational aspects of polynomial and signomial problems will not be 
discussed here, but are dealt with among others in Dinkel et al. [1974], Duffin 
and Peterson [1973], Nijkamp [1972] and Rijckaert [1977]. 
A Simple Conflict Model for Growth and Environmental Quality. 
Assume a city or region with 2 interest groupings with conflicting 
objectives, viz. supporters of economie growth and environmentalists. This 
situation will now be described by means of a simple model. 
The supporters of economie growth want to maximize production q , i.e. 
(4.1.) max <j> = q 
The production is assumed to be related to productive investments i by means 
of a non-linear technological function incorporating scale advantages, i.e., 
(4.2.) q = a ig g > 1 
The environmentalists aim at maximizing environmental quality e, i.e., 
(4.3.) max <f> = e 
This objective function can be operationalized by assuming that environmental 
quality can be improved by spending a large part of available resources to the 
preservation of environmental commodities (such as abatement investments) and 
to the creation of natural areas. By denoting these environmental investments 
by z, the second objective function may now be written as: 
(4.4.) max <j> = 8zy , 
where the assumption is made that environmental quality is related in the 
following way to environmental investments: 
(4.5.) e = 6zy , V < 1 
The latter relationships indicates that every decrease in environmental 
quality (caused by an increase in production or consumption) may be com-
pensated by environmental investments. The meaning of this assumption can be 
illustrated by assuming the existence of a certain pollution emission 
relationship (see Nijkamp [1977a]). The pollution is assumed to be related to 
the production by means of a non-linear emission function: 
(4.6.) p = yq S < 1 
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Next, the assumption is made that the emission coëfficiënt y can be in-
fluenced by implementing abatement mvestments z, i.e., 
(4.7.) y = nz~E 
Substitution of (4.6.) into (4.5.) yields the result: 
(4.8.) -e 6 nz q 
so that any increase in the emission of pollution can be reduced by imple-
menting more abatement mvestments. 
Clearly, the maximum of (4.1.) would be infinite, if these would be no 
constraints on the investments. Similarly, the maximum of (f>? would be infinite, 
if there would be no constraints on the available resources. Therefore, it 
is plausible to assume an upper limit t for the total investment budget which 
may be allocated between productive investments and environmental investments, 
i.e. , 
(4.9.) ï + z 
The variables i and z may be regarded as the decision variables which 
determine the value of the arguments of the urban (or regional) welfare 
profile, viz. q and e. The decision space is represented by Fig. 2. 
0 t z 
Fig. 2. Decision space of productive and abatement investments. 
It is clear that a maximization of (4.1.) subject to (4.9.) will give A as 
the optimal solution. The maximization of (4.3.) subject to (4.9.) obviously 
leads to B as the optimal solution; the compromise may be located somewhere 
on AB. 
A compromise solution between maximum growth and maximum emvironmental 
quality can be formally found by using the idea of a multi-objective pro-
gramming analysis set out in section 2 and 3. 
By applying the idea of a geometrie parametrisation of the objective 
functions (see (3.14.) ), the multi-objective geometrie programming model 
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associated with the abovementioned model can be specified as: 
(1.10.) rmax <j) = <j> 
U.t. (4.9.) 
1 *2 
where X-, and \„ are the parametric weights (elasticities). The latter objective 
model can be re-written in a Standard geometrie programming format as: 
(4.11.) min <j> * ~
X1 ~A2 
•l *2 
-Ax -gA1 
a i 
•x -yx2 
z 
a i 
•BA. -KA, 
where: 
(4.12.) 
= a 
1 
-A, 
Obviously, a high value of i and z will lead to a low value of <f). Finally, 
the following model can be obtained: 
(4.13.) min cj> 
y s.t. 
* ~3A1 -KA 2 
a i z 
-1 . -1 
t ï + t z < 1 
which corresponds to the general geometrie programming model (3.1.). 
According to (3.7.) the dual constraints of this model can be written as: 
(4.14.) 
1 
-ex 
-KX, 
I 
o 
1 
o 
o 
v l 
r 
1 
1 
v l = 0 
1 
_
V2 _ 0 
* 
The number of degrees of freedom of these dual constraints appears to be 
equal to 0, so that the dual variables can be directly solved from (4.14.) 
by means of a simple matrix inversion. This leads to the following result: 
_-l 
v° 1 0 0 
(4.15.) 
o 
v l  0 1 1 
1 
v l = -BA1 1 0 0 = 8A 
1 
V2 -KA 0 1 0 KA 
— - "-
According to the primal-dual relationships (see section 3) the following 
optimal solutions of the variables i and z can be derived: 
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(4.16.) 
and 
(4.17.) 
BA1 
BX1 + KX 2 
K \ 2 
6X1 + K X 2 
By means of a parametrisation of (4.10.), the efficiency frontier of the 
objective functions (j>1 and <f> can, in principle, be determined (see Fig. 3; see 
also section 2). 
Fig. 3. The efficiency frontier of q and e. 
This figure demonstrates that by means of new multi-objective programming 
techniqués, in principle, an ultimate compromise solution can be identified. 
The first conclusion is thus that non-linear optimization models describing 
conflicts between diverging objectives can be attacked by means of generalized 
multi-objective posynomial models. 
The ideal point P of Fig. 3 (with co-ordinates q* and e*) can now be used 
as a frame of reference for an interactive approach based on a successive series 
of 'displaced ideals'. This implies that a trial solution has to be identified 
which is calculated by means of a Minkowski metric for a minimum discrepancy 
between the ideal point and the efficiency frontier. Therefore, de following 
program has to be solved (see also (2.4.) ): 
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(4.18.) 
'min * = 1(1 - TT ) V + (1-TT ) V } 1 / V 
«• q e 
X 
s . t 
TT 
1 
ir 
e 
II
 
ii
 
ii 
• l -
.min 
*1 II
 
ii
 
ii 
,max 
*1 
* 2 " 
.min 
- *1 
.min 
*2 
II
 
ii
 
ii 
,max 
*2 -
• 3 a 1 
.min 
- *2 
.mm 
<l>2 = e z 
i + z < t 
,min 
where <}>.. and <j> are the minimum feasible values of tj>1 and c|>_, respectively, 
and (J> (=q*) and <(> (=e*) the maximum feasible values of ([>.. and <f> , respect-
ively. 
The latter program is again a geometrie program, as can easily be seen by. 
rewriting (4.18.) as: 
( 4 . 1 9 . ) 
min ^ = l / v 
- 1 v - 1 v 
r r + r r q e 
r + TT - 1 
q. q 
= 1 
r + IT 
e e 
u max 1 
.min-v - 1 .min - 1 
•<P1 ) Tf <?-!_ + ^ 9 - L 
...max .min-, , - 1 , .min , - 1 
( • 2 - * 2 ) ire * 2 + * 2 * 2 
- 1 - 1 
t 1 + t z < 1 
a 1 
= 1 
* , = e z' 
The latter program can be solved by means of Standard geometrie (posynomial) 
programming techniques. The solution of this program is a point somewhere on 
the efficiency frontier of Fig. 3, and will be denoted by cL and e1. This trial 
solution may be used as a tooi in an Interactive urban or regional decision-
making process: the only Information needed concerns the question which value 
of the trial solutions is not satisfactory. This gives rise to a new constraint 
which may be added to (4.13.) (see also secion 2). Consequently, a (horizontal 
or vertical) displacement of the ideal solution P toward the axis of the 
satisfactory solution takes place. Then the procedure may be repeated again and 
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again, until finally a converging compromise solution Is attained. 
The second conclusion is that geometrie programming models may be useful 
tools for Interactive decision models based on the method of displaced ideals 
via a Minkowski metric. 
5. A Spatial Externalities Model for Displaced Ideals. 
Finally, interdependences in a spatial system can also be studied in a 
more appropriate manner by means of the foregoing multi-objective posynomial 
approach. A first way of introducing spatial interdependences is to assume a 
set of cities or regions with negative mutual spill-over effects. An example 
may be the existence of environmental externalities, so that the environmental 
quality of region 1 is affected by the pollution resulting from the production 
of region 2. This problem can be regarded as a straightforward generalizatlon 
of the foregoing conflict model and can in principle be solved by means of the 
same approach via displaced ideals (see also Hafkamp and Nljkamp [1978]). This 
extension will not be dealt with here any further. 
An alternative assumption may be a 'keeping up with the Joneses' effect. 
This implies that each city or region within the spatial system at hand evaluates 
its welfare on the basis of a reference profile which Is co-determined by the 
welfare levels of other regions (see also Klaassen [ 1978]). 
The basic idea is here that the welfare of each city or region r (r = 1, 
...,R) can be represented by means of a welfare profile x (see section 2) with 
arguments x. (i=l,...,I; r=l,...,R). Without loss of generality the assumption 
is made that for each element of the welfare profile the condition holds: 'the 
higher, the better', so that the multi-dimensional objective function of each 
city or region is: 
(5.1.) max d> = x 
- r -r 
This multi-objective model can again be solved by means of the approach set out 
above. 
In the case of spatially interdependent behaviour one may assume that each 
region or city evaluates its welfare profile against the background of the 
maximum attainable welfare profile in the whole spatial system concerned. In 
other words, the reference profile x has the followlng elements x. : 
(5.2.) x. = max x. , Vi 
+•1-» 
Therefore, the i objective function of each spatial unit or region may be 
assumed to be: 
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(5.3.) min J,
 = x
m a x
 _
 x 
ir i ir 
1) 
The latter multi-objective optimization problem can also be attacked by means 
of the method described in section 4, as will be illustrated now. 
Let us first assume a multi-objective multi-regional, but spatially independ-
ent optimization problem (see (5.1.) ). In case of two regions 1 and 2 the model 
from section 4 can be written as: 
(5.4.) 
max <j> 11 
max cf>12 
max <f> 
max §r 
21 
22 "2 
s.t. (4.2.), ("4.4.) and (4.9.) 
By applying a geometrie parametrization of this multi-objective model the 
following optimization problem can be specified (see (4.13.) ): 
(5.5.) < 
min <J> = a 
s.t. 
t"1 ix + t"1 z± < 1 
t2 i2 + t.2 z2 < 1 
*Sc ."B1A11 "K1X12 ."B2X21 •K2X22 
The dual constraints of this geometrie programming model are: 
(5.5.) 
1 0 0 0 0 
3 1 A 1 1 1 0 0 0 
K1X12 0 1 0 0 
32A21 0 0 1 0 
K2X22 0 0 0 1 
" ° 1 
v l 
1 
1 
v l 
1 
0 
V2 
2 
— U 
Vl 
2 
u 
v (J 
L 2 1 L J 
so that the dual variables are equal to: 
max 1) Clearly, if x. = x. , the objective function should be max x. . J
 ir ï xr 
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(5.6.) 
O 
v l 1 
1 
v l B1X11 
1 
V2 
r K1X12 
2 
Vl B2A21 
2 
_
V2 .. „K2A22 . 
Consequently, the optimal values of the decision variables are: 
(5.7.) 
• O eiXll 
.o 
B1 X11 + 
V2I 
K1X12 
X2 - B2X21 + K2X22 
K1X12 
S1X11 + K1X12 
K2X22 
e2X21 + K2X22 
The procedure of displaced ideals via a Minkowski metric discussed in 
section 4 can be applied here in an analogous manner. 
Now the assumption of a multi-objective multi-regional spatially inter-
dependent decision system may be made, so that an objective function of type 
(5.2.) has to be used. Then the following multi-objective function may be 
specified: 
(5.8.) min if n 
i,r 
(x' max x. ) 
ir 
ir 
or in terms of the foregoing model: 
(5.9.) max qx) 
11 
•mm t|) - (q 
s.t. (4.2.), (4.4.) and (4.9.) 
, max ^ 12 (e - e1) , max , 21 (q - q2) 
,. max v (e - e2) 
The latter model can be solved by means of Standard geometrie programming 
techniques via the abovementioned procedure of displaced ideals. The outcome 
is in fact the result of a game strategy with multiple participants. 
The latter model provides a static picture. Given the reference pattern of 
a maximum welfare profile, the compromise solution for each city or region can 
be identified via a parametric multi-objective procedure. It should be noted, 
however, that after a certain period the reference pattern undergoes a change 
due to the decisions in each city or region. This implies that a realization of 
the optimal values of the decision variables exerts an influence upon the refer-
ence pattern for the decision in a next period. This shift in x can also be 
regarded as a displacement of ideals in a dynamic setting. A further analysis of 
the equilibrium conditions of such a recursive procedure of displaced ideals 
would require the use of a complete dynamic model which might, for example, be 
solved by means 
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of Bellman's optimality principle. The essential Ideas of displaced ideals In a 
multi-regional welfare setting, however, will remain the same in such a multi-
objective programming model. The main difference concerns the shifts in urban 
(regional) resources t due to the successive production and investment decisions 
in previous periods and the resulting shifts in ideal points. 
The conclusion of this section is that non-linear multi-objective decision 
models are a useful tooi for adaptive choice behaviour leading to interdependent 
decisions between actors. 
Conclusion. 
Modern optimization theory is, in many respects, confronted with conflict-
ing objectives, among which a compromise has to be found. Multi-objective decision 
theory can be regarded as an appropriate tooi to treat these problems. Especially 
the method of displaced ideals appears to be meaningful to find a compromise 
solution in an Interactive manner. The use of geometrie programming techniques 
is useful to deal with non-linearities in these types of models. Finally, 
interdependent deeision-making via a recursive shift of ideal reference patterns 
can also be dealt with in an analogous manner; this gives rise to a general-
ization of the ideas of displaced ideals over a series of decision periods. 
Consequently, the notion of a displaced ideal is an extremely important concept 
for a more advanced optimization methodology for multi-regional planning and 
decision-making. 
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